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Abstract
Japanese firms are known to practice "permanent employment." It is
said that there is absolutely no layoff between an employee's entry into
the firm and his mandatory retirement. However, basic economic statistics
indicate considerable fluctuations in output and employment in Japanese
industries. This paper attempts to resolve the apparent inconsistency
between "permanent employment" and workforce flexibility by a realistic
description of what Japanese firms actually do. The secret of Japanese
workforce management is that the employee status is diversified and that
the core employees enjoying a "permanent" status are assisted by a large
number of nonpermanent employees subject to hiring and firing by the
employer at will. The author interviewed managers and union leaders of
several electronics firms to learn about ways in which workforce adjust-
ment was practiced. Although "permanent employment" covers a small
portion of the workforce, firms obviously honor the ideal as much as
possible. Their commitment to the ideal of "permanent employment"
induces them to do things that firms in other countries would not do.
The impetus for innovations on the part of management and for hard work
on the part of workers is generated by the commitment to the ideal of
"permanent employment." In the aggregate, this results in a measure of
employment stabilization combined with technological progress and
productivity growth.

Introduction
Journalistically speaking, "everyone knows" that the Japanese practice
"permanent employment" which permits no layoff between hiring and retirement
of an employee. Best-sellers have been written and millions of dollars of
consultant fees are being earned by scholars and practioners who expound on
this alleged virtue of the Japanese employment system. And yet even a cursory
look at the basic economic statistics impresses one with considerable fluc-
tuations in output and employment in Japanese industries. The data belie the
implications of permanent employment. The notes that follow attempt to describe
and evaluate how permanent employment relationships are in Japanese electrical
and electronic industries. Changes in the product demand and technology as
well as shifts in the competitive advantages of firms and industries are
unavoidable in a dynamic capitalist economy like Japan's. Even if workers and
employers were committed to the ideal of lasting emplojrment relationships, the
implementation of the ideal in practice would still be severely constrained by
the dynamic forces of the economy. The notes below then amount to an explora-
tion of the nature of the gap between ideal and practice . Japanese firms do
seem to be committed to the ideal of employment guarantee for their employees.
This commitment seems to have produced fascinating tendencies in the management
of the factors and forces that determine employment. Simply put, it appears
that Japanese firms, workers, unions, and government do things that their
counterparts in other countries do not do, because of the commitment to the
ideal of employment guarantee. The outcome of the efforts is still far from
permanent employment as in its popular image. These notes attempt to fathom
that distance.
Employment adjustment in the Japanese electrical and
electronic industry
Observations on employment trends and changes vary depending upon
the sources of data used. The usual Labor Ministry monthly labor survey
is a sample survey of workers in establishments employing 30 or more
"regular" workers. The Census of Manufacture covers all places of work
engaged in the production of goods falling under various industrial
categories. There are a few more surveys which report on employment
either as their principal objective or as byproducts of their other
concerns. Attempts to reconcile different figures from these various
sources may have their own reward. But in this paper, we are concerned
with the rough magnitude and direction of change and will ignore minor
differences among various data sources until meticulous attention to
details is called for.
Table 1 presents employment and its sex composition by major branch
of the Japanese E & E industry. The classification of the E & E
(Table 1 about here)
industry is the one used in the study by the Federation of the Unions
of Electrical and Electronic Workers. This classification is based on
a common view of the E & E industry in Japan and indicates how workers
themselves view the structure of the industry with different degrees of
importance assigned to its various branches from the worker's point of
view. Each branch requires some grouping of 3-digit or 4-digit cate-
gories in the Census of Manufactures.
The years up to 1973 were generally a period of rapid growth,
although slackening of growth began in some branches around 1970. Most
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remarkable is the peaking in 1969 of employment in the production of
radio and television sets. In the whole E & E industry, employment hit
the trough in 1975. In 1978, according to this particular source of
data, overall E & E emplojnnent had not yet recovered its 1973 level.
Two years later, in 1980, according to a different source of data (the
Labor Ministry's Monthly Labor Survey), E & E employment was roughly
the same as the 1973 level. Since labor productivity increased con-
siderably during the same period, the return of employment to the 1973
level meant an enormously more productive E & E industry in 1980 than
at any time before. ...
In the Japanese E & E industry, the segmentation of the work force
by sex is a matter of particular importance, more so than in manufac-
turing as a whole. When the need for expansion or contraction of
employment arises, the sex composition of the E & E work force responds
sensitively to the required changes. To simplify an essentially complex
matter, the core work force is usually male, while the peripheral work
force is usually female. Of course, not all male workers can get into
the core work force. There are many male workers who are peripheral
—
temporary, casual, subcontracting workers. Nor are all female workers
peripheral. Many are engaged in the core activities of production;
e.g., assembling. But "core" or "peripheral" is not only functional as
pertains to a job, but also social as pertains to the person on the job.
The social status differentiation outside the work place is such that
there is a predisposition in the Japanese firms to staff the core work
force with men or to consider men's jobs core activities even where
these are functionally peripheral. In contrast, female workers employed
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in functionally essential jobs are socially dovmgraded and treated as
if they did not matter at all.
The proportion of female workers in the work force increases during
an upswing of industrial activities and decreases during a downswing.
This means that during an upswing, peripheral workers are added to the
work force and that during a downswing, they are dismissed. In this
way, the fluctuations in the core work force is minimized. Since labor
problems (industrial conflict, social unrest, etc.) arise from the
insecurity of male core workers, Japanese firms have long practiced
prudent employment policy with respect to male workers. The equation
of female workers to peripheral workers means the flexible use of female
workers as shock absorbers for employment fluctuations. At the end of
the rapid economic growth of the 1960s , the women workers nearly
reached a parity with men in the E & E work force. If we allow for the
casual and temporary components of male workers, it seems safe to say
that at the height of economic expansion Japan's E & E industry filled
more than half of its labor requirements by workers who would leave the
jobs or could be made to leave on short notice. With this cushion of
adjustable work force, it is no wonder that the downward employment
adjustment after 1973 was carried out with a minimum of friction.
A statistically testable hypothesis that emerges from the above
observation is that during the post-OPEC recession, the rate of decrease
in employment should have been correlated with the proportion of women
in the work force: that is, across industries, the higher the initial
proportion of women, the higher the rate of decrease in employment.
Once the observations about the role of female workers mentioned earlier
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is accepted, this quantitative hypothesis would follow from them almost
as a tautological restatement of the same thing. In fact, a detailed
quantitative study bears this out.
The quinquennial population census also shows differential trends
in the movement of male and female emplojrment in the E & E industry.
For 1970, 1975, and 1980, paid employment by sex changed as follows (in
2
thousands, though rounded to nearest 10,000, Japanese man )
:
Male Female Total
1970 770 600 1,370
1975 780 470 1,250
1980 820 590 1,420
It is remarkable that the fluctuations in total paid employment are
largely absorbed by changes in female employment. Male employment
records a net gain even at the bottom of the unprecedented recession of
1973-1975. Different sources result in different figures on the level
and composition of employment, but the degree of agreement on the broad
features of change is high: that is, steady or increasing employment
of men, and fluctuating employment of women.
The role of women as peripheral workers in the Japanese-style
employment system is further illustrated by differential movements of
employment for men and women by size of enterprise. In 1970, women
accounted for more than a half of the work force in enterprises employ-
ing 1,000 or more workers. The proportion was barely a third in 1979.
In contrast, the proportion of women increased from 31 to 40 percent in
the work force of establishments with 100 to 999 workers and likewise
from 17 to 27 percent in the work force of establishments with 10 to 99
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workers. Jobs in smaller establishments may be better than no work at
all, but their benefits to women workers must be compared with the
losses due to exclusion from employment in large high-wage firms.
The Federation study also presents statistics on employment by sex
3
in 13 major E & E firms. There was a steady decrease in women's
employment between 1971 and 1979. With 1970 as 100, the index number
for 1971 was 105 (peak) and, for 1979, 50. (There was a small gain in
women's employment in 1980, raising the index number to 54.2.) The
index of men's employment in these 13 major firms rose to 113.6 in 1975
and fell to 105 in 1980. Total employment of men and women peaked in
1971 and decreased during the 1970s. The Federation study notes this
as a decline in the E & E industry's "ability to employ" and considers
it a curious complement of a great increase in the economic strength of
these industries during the same period. The Federation study attributes
the employment trends to the acceleration of technological progress and
the rise in the degree of "knowledge-intensity" in these industries
requiring workers of higher education and better skills while eliminating
unskilled and semi-skilled jobs on which large numbers of female workers
were traditionally employed.
This vulnerability of women workers to the adverse impact of tech-
nological progress has aroused the concerns of the Federation. In con-
junction with the data from the 13 major firms, the study adds this
4
comment
:
In contrast to other advanced countries, Japan has
never given employment security to her women
workers. Under Japanese trade unionism, women have
not benefitted from the unique employment system of
-6-
Japan. For these reasons , Japanese women workers '
are characterized by high labor mobility and return
to household activities upon losing jobs. Because
under these circumstances women have been able to
survive without jobs or incomes, they have not con-
sidered themselves unemployed when they lose their
jobs. Thus, the decline in female employment has
not surfaced as an increase in unemployment.
(Translated)
The study then adds that the generally short durations of job holding
on the part of women workers—3 or 4 years at most—enable employers to
introduce labor-saving technology without creating labor problems by
synchronizing it with the completion of the attrition. In other words,
by rapid employment turnover, women workers have contributed to their
employers' technological progress. The study's conclusion on women
workers is: "the adverse impact of technological progress on the
employment of women is undeniable, and women are forced to make great
sacrifices."
What is fascinating about the employment experience of these 13
firms is that the steady decline in employment of women during the 1970s
was apparently independent of the recession induced by the OPEC shock
of 1973. Since men's employment increased between 1970 and 1975 and
decreased after 1976 slowly, this too was independent of whatever
effects the OPEC shock may have had on these firms. In another source
in which 10 major E & E firms are examined individually, total sales
dropped slightly in 1975 and net profits on the whole decreased by 50
percent. The sharp decline in net profits was certainly due in part
to the sharp rise in the energy and labor costs in 1973 and 1974. It
appears that the firms absorbed the cost increases in the form of
reduced profits but did not resort to shortrun cost-saving measures
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like laying off workers or reducing production to any great extent.
Almost unperturbed by the sharp shortrun change in economic conditions,
these firms went about implementing their longrun technological innova-
tions. These innovations had an adverse longrun effect on employment
as indicated by the Federation study. The steady reduction of employ-
ment during the 1970s was not an adjustment to a decreasing demand for
products but a technologically required adjustment under a strong long-
run demand for many E & E products. In electrical and electronic
industries as a whole, cyclical sensitivity of women's employment is
observed, falling rapidly during a downswing (1973-75) and rising
rapidly during an upswing (after 1975). But major firms seem to have
been above the vagaries of shortrun market conditions. With steady
hands, they planned and implemented incessant technological progress.
The Japanese E & E industry seems to be dualistic.
Technological progress destroys and creates jobs. It is true that
employment of men is fairly secure, but it is clear at the same time
that men can remain employed only insofar as they can learn and perform
new skills as existing jobs disappear and new jobs arise under continuing
innovations. A good question is whether all men are capable of con-
tinuous learning and adaptation over their entire working lives. Those
who can learn and adapt at the same pace as technological change move
along with changing jobs and are rewarded with higher wages and benefits
commensurate with rising productivity. But as workers age, even some
of those who earlier were capable of going along may burn out at dif-
ferent life stages. In other words, the employer is beset with the
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problems of incompetents and burned-outs as the side effects of tech-
nological progress. But Japanese firms have been adept at creating
jobs for them. In certain instances, employers created subsidiaries
specializing in landscaping and gardening services and transferred
older untrainable employees to them. In order for these new business
units to be economically viable, however, they would have to generate
enough business over and above weeding and cleaning the employers'
premises. To what extent the honoring of lifetime employment in this
way can become a viable business proposition is therefore a good ques-
tion. The effectiveness of "employer WPA" (employers' ability to gen-
erate make work projects) in Japan requires further research.
Major firms are apparently interested in keeping themselves lean
and productive by diverting inessential or auxilliary activities to
newly created subsidiaries by subcontracting them out to smaller firms.
In this way, a closely knit group of firms is created under the leader-
ship of a dominant firm. Streams of new products resulting from inno-
vations also result in independent divisions and often independent
firms. When a firm controls several tens of lesser firms engaged in
diverse activities, it is possible to correlate individual employees'
abilities and aptitudes with the spectrum of jobs available within the
group and through reassignme,nts and transfers ensure lifetime employ-
ment within it. The Japanese have perfected the fine art of business-
empire building which is an important part of the mechanism of guaran-
teeing lifetime employment to male permanent employees.
Japanese trade unions have so far been cooperative with the pace of
technological change under the initiative of managements and with the
training, transfers and reassignments required by changing technology.
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Procedures are worked out through consultations and collective bargain-
ing. It is remarkable by international comparison that Japanese trade
unions have never sought any control over the pace and kind of tech-
nological change to minimize the pains of learning and adaptation.
Rather, the popular assumption shared by managements and unions alike
is that Japanese workers have an infinite supply of personal resource-
fulness and adaptability. This assumption puts tremendous pressure on
individual workers who must sacrifice a large amount of their own time
to acquire new knowledge and skills. Under the circumstances, the
failure to move along with on-going change is a personal shame. He who
fails drops out. Voluntary quits of this kind reinforce the camaraderie
of those who remain and keep adapting. If an incompetent does not drop
out, he is assigned to inconsequential tasks so he may not do any harm
to the general pace of progress. True, he is kept in employ for life.
But what he gets is the treatment that the Japanese humorously call
"kaigoroshi"—to paraphrase, well-fed life imprisonment till death.
The proportion of Japanese permanent workers under "kiagoroshi" is said
to be non-negligible. This of course applies to men only. Women
workers who are liberated from life-time emplojrment are also spared the
potential indignity of "kaigoroshi."
However, "kaigoroshi" cannot do much psychological harm to those
"imprisoned." Japanese workers are remarkably insensitive to the sta-
tus aspects of a job. Social democracy has attained a very high level
based upon the equalizing fact that everyone is a member of the same
firm (shain). The status reward is seniority, which translates into a
rank and pay not necessarily correlated with what a worker does. Workers
-lo-
in Britain or America are fairly discriminating about "good" jobs and
"bad" jobs and believe that "job satisfaction" is an intrinsic quality
of the job. For example, cleaning a latrine would never enter the con-
tent of any respectable job a worker seeks. Latrine cleaning is con-
sidered demeaning anywhere. But in Japan, doing it does not demean the
person who does it. In order to show high-mindedness and to instill a
spirit of service into workers, it is said that some company presidents
have cleaned workers' latrines. In other countries, company presidents
do not even share a lunch table with workers. In Japan, examples abound
that suggest the non-existence of well-defined and well-guarded job
demarcations. Doing different things upon a moment's notice does not
annoy or inconvenience Japanese workers. They do not instinctively ask
the way American or British workers do whether the new job is better or
worse than the present job. Job rotations and transfers in Japanese
enterprises are accepted by workers with no special feelings for or
against.
Occupational classification then has little value as a predictor of
personal satisfaction or social status as far as paid employment is
concerned. Independent professions like medicine and law enjoy appro-
priate recognition in society at large. But "organization men" or
"salary men" draw their social standings from the relative importance
of the organizations or firms of which they are "members." The Federa-
tion study frequently referred to above has data which indicate the
uselessness of occupational classification. Based on the quinquennial
population census, between 1970 and 1975, among white-collar workers of
the E & E industry, specialist and technical workers decreased by 22
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percent. In absolute numbers, the increase in sales workers was
roughly equal to the decrease in specialists and technicians. Among
the specialists and technicians, scientists and researchers almost dis-
appeared! In view of the vigor of the Japanese E & E industry during
the 1970s, this statistical picture of occupational classification is
incredible: the picture is that of a grave crisis. Fortunately, how-
ever, it is probably more appropriate to say that company employees did
not know how to describe their occupations, and that their frequent
rotations, transfers and promotions resulted in unreliable enumerations.
Or the statistics may be suggesting that some large scale transfers of
specialist-technician category to sales during the recession: for
example, sales engineers.
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Table 1
Employment in the electric and electronic industry by
branch and sex, selected years, 1965-78
(Numbers of persons)
1965 1969 1973 1975 1978
Men and women
Total 851,454 1,268,242 1,398,738 1,214,082 1,239,935
Industrial E & E 236,787 314,609 350,609 311,065 307,644
Telecommunications 87,543 90,176 98,748 86,062 79,361
Electronic apparatus 20,664 53,434 78,569 86,563 101,185
Household E & E 88,416 100,465 112,318 108,455 111,864
Radio & TV 58,301 97,417 63,690 52,628 46,308
Sound equipment 39,458 130,550 184,892 163,152 181,170
Parts and components 193,775 319,002 339,041 263,096 271,755
Others 126,510 162,589 170,871 145,438 140,648
Women
Total 338,165 604,354 656,836 515,509 535,766
(39.7) (47.7) (47.0) (42.5) (43.2)
Industrial E & E 73,748 106,608 125,070 102,019 105,508
(31.1) (33.9) (35.7) (32.8) (34.3)
Te lecoramunicat ions 30,744 33,375 34,459 27,404 23,265
(35.1) (37.0) (34.9) (31.8) (29.3)
Electronic apparatus 4,333 16,300 25,245 25,063 30,106
(21.0) (30.5) (32.1) (29.0) (29.8)
Household E & E 30,646 42,702 48,599 40,987 45,543
' (34.7) (42.5) (43.3) (37.8) (40.7)
Radio & TV 27,220 52,820 . 30,987 25,120 20,542
(46.7) (54.2) (48.7) (47.7) (44.7)
Sound equipment 19,413 76,245 114,067 96,280 109,655
(49.2) (58.4) (61.7) (59.0) (60.5)
Parts and components 112,083 202,393 201,104 142,025 143,435
(57.8) (63.4) (59.3) (54.0) (52.8)
Others 39,978 73,911 77,305 56,611 57,712
(31.6) (45.5) (45.2) (38.9) (41.0)
Sources: Denki Roren, Denki sangyo no chukitekl koyo tenbo (1981), p. 9, p. 16
Figures in parentheses are proportions of women in total employment in percent.
Impressions from interviews with managers and union leaders
These interviews are a great help for insights and perspectives.
They also result in rich crops of public relations materials, even some
delicate materials not meant for outsiders, books and articles by past
or present presidents, serious publications by specialists with doctorates
who in many places also double as part-time lecturers at colleges and
universities, company and union histories, employee newsletters and
union journals, all sorts of handouts and fliers. For analytical pur-
poses, these tangible and durable materials are more valuable in the
long run than notes and recollections on conversations, films or displays.
Nevertheless, talking with people who run organizations is useful for
weighing the various factors that one obtains from the other "tangible
and durable materials."
To the question "how do you cope with possible redundancies due to
the weakening of demand for certain products or under the impact of a
general recession?" managers everywhere answer the same way first
before they take up details in many different ways: "we cut hours of
work, cut or eliminate dividend payments, reduce wages and salaries if
necessary-reduce bonuses for sure, or move people around from plant to
plant, division to division, or firm to firm within our group of firms."
Laying workers off does not enter the list of first actions the firm
takes in response to poor sales or bad economic conditions.
One is impressed with two principal characteristics of major
Japanese firms: i.e., they are diversified, multi-product firms, and
each "governs" a large group of firms which includes banks, subsidiaries.
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affiliates, subcontractors, suppliers, dealers, movers, wholesalers,
and retailers. Japanese firms' obsession with the market share enables
novelists (and some economists) to liken their oligopolistic competition
to struggles among powerful feudal lords of bygone days. Japanese sales
activities certainly smack of large-scale feudal maneuvers of foot sol-
diers. The feudal analogy becomes more serviceable if we view Japan as
a system of oligopolistic domains precariously held together by the
shogunate of Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations). The
oligopolistic domain is the aforementioned group of firms with a major
manufacturer as its leader. It is probably no exaggeration to say that
the grouping of firms is a basic economic institution responsible for
the flexible dynamism of the Japanese economy.
In a major Japanese firm, thanks to its diversification, even as
demand for some products declines, there are always other products
enjoying strong demand. Thus, transfers of workers between factories
or divisions alone may enable the firm to absorb the need for a sharp
.' reduction in the workforces of some of its divisions. Transfers of
members to the member-firms of the group follow the same logic, though
with minor procedural complications arising from the legal independence
• '• of the firms. The only real constraint then is the degree of willing-
ness of the workers and unions to cooperate. This is a function of the
quality of labor-management relations. But it is obvious that Japanese
management makes every effort to win and maintain workers' and unions'
confidence as a basis for cooperation. When sacrifice is called for,
the axe first falls on the high and mighty—stockholders, executives
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and managers who must swallow reductions in dividend payments and
salaries as well as organizational reform including elimination of cer-
tain positions. After the evidence of sacrifice by these more favorably
placed members of the company community is demonstrated, the remaining
share of hardship is allocated to the workers. Pecuniary sacrifice
imposed on them is proportionately less than that imposed on stock-
holders, executives and managers. But the workers must adapt to the
required changes in the job structure and manpower allocation. There
are extensive reassignments and transfers. The unions usually ask for
and obtain safeguards to reduce the pain-cost of adjustment on the part
of the workers.
Actually, moving around is not such a great pain to Japanese
workers as it would be to workers elsewhere, because job rotations
between divisions or between plants at different geographical locations
are institutionalized and accepted by all concerned in the Japanese
firm. If there are concerns over worker adaptability and trainability,
technical as well as social, at new places of work, the fine art of
Japanese management has pre-empted the potential problems. Workers are
screened carefully at the time of hiring with respect to these and other
qualities that make the lifelong employment workable. And the firm
subsequently invests heavily in the management of relations with each
employee looking after all his personal and career needs. This system
gives to management an almost total knowledge of ability, aptitude,
aspirations, outlook, habits, tastes, etc. to the extent that may
horrify even a half-hearted individualist who places at least some pre-
mium on the autonomy of individual personality. In return, each
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employee is trusted with most detailed inforaation on all aspects of
the firm which would horrify anyone concerned with "managerial prero-
gatives." Although this kind of employment relationship may give rise
to misgivings on the part of non-Japanese observers, it apparently
works well in Japan.
In the course of an interview, a manager at one company recalled
how the experience during the recession of 1965, which hit the house-
hold appliances particularly hard, served as a usable precedent for the
employment adjustment called for under the OPEC-induced recession of
1973-75. In 1965, one third of several thousand blue-collar employees
were redundant. Although the household appliances divisions had no
work, the telecommunications equipment divisions were extremely busy.
The redundant workers were therefore transferred from the slack divi-
sions to the busy divisions. A small number of workers left over were
temporarily transferred to other firms in the group. In order to secure
the cooperation of the employees with the transfer program, the company
opened its books and explained everything to them about the state of
business. The company and the trade union of its employees already had
a labor-management consultative council since 1951 instituted in the
wake of the previous year's serious labor disputes. The company pro-
mised the transferred employees that they would be out for no longer
than six months and that their wages and benefits would not change.
Some of the plants to report to were far away from the transferred
workers' residential area, requiring a temporary separation of the
workers from their families. In these cases, the company-paid trips
back to homes and families were granted once a month. Although the
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workers were integrated into the work force of the divisions and firms
to which they were transferred, their foremen at the original work
place went with them to act as general advisors though with no power to
supervise them. The directors and supervisors of the transferred
workers' original divisions visited them at least once a month to
assure them that their relationships with the original divisions were
intact. The transferred workers fitted well into the new places of
work. Their re-orientation and re-training took two or three weeks at
the most. The workers returned to the original divisions after six
months, but by then the recession of the household appliances was over.
The employment adjustment under the OPEC shock was an expanded and
refined application of the 1965 experience, according to this manager.
Union leaders of the firm were also interviewed. Although the mood
was more somber in the union office than in the company reception room,
the union leaders on the whole confirmed the largely peaceful adjustment
to the need for a reduction In the workforce during the OPEC recession.
The union cooperated with the company through consultation for planning
and implementing the required workforce reduction. The union and the
company consulted and agreed on the number of persons to be reduced and
the work places where the work force should be reduced. Then, the
foremen of these work places were enpowered to select which workers
should be transferred out of these places. A grievance procedure was
also provided for along with the program of work force reduction and
transfer. Although the union would rather have work brought to the
slack divisions, it did not object in principle to the transfer of
workers from slack to busy divisions within the firm. But in 1974,
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reshuffling alone could not guarantee work to everyone. A layoff
(Japanese style) was considered necessary and implenented. Three to
four thousand workers in nearly 30 plants were laid off for a week at
different times. Fortunately, the E & E industry got out of the reces-
sion by the middle of 1975. The really serious period was only about
six months.
A retired manager of another diversified E & E firm was interviewed.
He shed light on how the managerial staff was handled in the course of
employment adjustment. First, the legitimacy of the need for adjustment
had to be established. Secondly, there had to be a principle of equit-
able sharing of the burden. An across-the-board reduction of salaries
was declared for managers and executives. Some of the managers were
called in by executives or the president and suggested that they move
to different jobs or to different companies in the group. White-collar
and blue-collar workers were transferred to different plants or to firms
inside or outside the group. The union objected to any drastic measure.
But eventually the union's consent to the plans for adjustment was
secured through negotiations on acceptable procedures and terms of
treatment. According to this ex-manager, the experience of his firm
during the OPEC recession de-mythologized "lifetime employment." He
said that lifetime employment was not a binding principle, but only a
statement of preference common among paid employees anywhere. He
emphasized the insecurity of the managerial class during the recession.
Managers were the first group to suffer cutbacks in pay. Some of their
positions were also eliminated under organizational reform to cut out
the "excess fat." Payouts and status changes (demotions and transfers)
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were communicated to them by a piece of paper
—
jirei (statement of
order) simply saying: "Your salary is cut by X percent, and you are
reassigned to Division Y, Section Z." As far as managers are concerned,
according to this ex-manager, the procedure and outcome were almost
ruthless. But the ethic of all this is that those who take the suf-
fering in stride are respected and that those who complain and hesitate
are scorned. A leader of the trade union of this firm confirmed that
the adjustment was no less drastic with respect to the production work-
force which was halved during the recession with many workers either
laid off or transferred to sales or other activities.
Similar stories were repeatedly heard at a few other firms and
unions. Obviously the problems of adjustment to the OPEC recession of
1973-75 did not last long. These increasingly shaded into long-term
problems of adjustment to changing markets, technology, and productivity.
The need for workforce reduction coupled with the hiring of new workers
who are better qualified for new technology poses many new problems
that did not exist when the burden of adjustment to a short-term reces-
sion had to be equitably shared. Trade unions call the new state of
affairs "rationalization." There are several aspects of "rationaliza-
tion" that worry workers: (1) some jobs disappear and new jobs come
into being, (2) the absolute mass of the labor input may decrease
depending on how fast productivity increases relative to the expansion
of the product market, (3) product innovations and marketing ingenuity
a firm is capable of may fall short of the extent needed for ensuring
everyone lifetime employment, (4) existing employees' willingness,
adaptability and capability for retraining may fall short of the pace
-8-
and extent required for cost-effective retraining. If employees cannot
keep up with rationalization within the bounds of pain-costs they can
accept, they may resort to individual or collective measures that
obstruct the progress of rationalization. Labor-management relations
sour, and rationalization is aborted in the costly chaos of industrial
disputes.
Interviews at several firms suggest that both managements and
unions are fairly optimistic about workers' adaptability and capability
for continued retraining—learning new jobs from time to time as
changing technology requires. Understandably managements are more
optimistic than unions. Japanese firms already have a sophisticated
art of personnel management , the essence of which is an unusual degree
of care for screening at the time of hiring so that employees with the
potential for sustained career development in the firm are identified.
The ideal employee is one who moves along with a succession of jobs
(job ladder) within a given technology and between different tech-
nologies. Japanese management perhaps assumes that such employees can
be found in a sufficient number to form the core of the work force.
How to handle the laggards and burned-outs is also within the Japanese
techniques of personnel management. Although this may sound like a
contradiction in terms, any major firm in Japan aspires to make itself
as small as possible in terms of employment. Smaller employment is
viewed desirable from the standpoints of productivity growth coupled
with increasing technological sophistication and maneuverability. This
means that a major firm creates, acquires, and cultivates its sub-
sidiaries and affiliates to which unwanted employees can be transferred.
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A visitor to any major firm is given a large brochure which somewhere
proudly shows a long list of subsidiaries and affiliates. At one major
firm specializing in telecommunications equipment, the managers inter-
viewed said that efforts to maintain the core workforce not only small
but well-balanced in a pyramidal structure between age groups and between
different levels of command included the aggressive creation of subsi-
diaries and affiliates by "spinning out" divisions after nursing them
in the firm for some time and that employees were transferred to them
as they moved up in the hierarchy to levels where the supply of posi-
tions became smaller. This means that many employees terminate employ-
ment at this firm and move to other firms at different stages of their
lives. For them, there is no lifetime emplo3nnent at this firm. But
apparently their lifetime employment is guaranteed within the group of
firms that this firm leads. This also means that the firm has to be
extremely innovative in new products to "spin out" subsidiaries and
affiliates.
Although it may sound rather ironical, aging is viewed as a basic
problem making it difficult to maintain lifetime employment. This is
ironical, because a lifetime cannot be free of aging, and because
anyone would have thought that lifetime employment automatically con-
tained appropriate responses to aging. The Japanese firms are currently
under pressure from the government and unions for raising the retirement
age to 60 or beyond. It is true that the retirement age is being
raised, although a large proportion of firms still set it at 55. But
what is interesting is that many firms subvert the retirement age by
finding ways to retire their employees at various life stages before
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the retirement age. The firm just referred to is one example. It is
commonly believed in Japan that the performance of many production
workers peaks at about age 40 and that retraining becomes increasingly
difficult after 40. They are therefore unfit as employees of a tech-
nologically dynamic firm. It is argued that they should be transferred
to technologically less dynamic firms where old-fashioned familiar jobs
may still be available although they have disappeared in the parent
firm.
How the performance of a worker can be maximized over his life
cycle is a complex question to which little specific attention so far
has been paid. The conventional labor management techniques are rarely
examined critically as to whether the assumptions on which they are
based are accurate or desirable. Lifetime employment has so far been
considered inseparable from a wage scale dominated by seniority incre-
ments. Under this system, the earnings of an employee keep rising up
to the very moment of his retirement. When the demand for a higher
retirement age arose, the question suddenly arose as to whether the
continuation of rising pay over the additional years in employment was
really justified. This then called into question the rationale of the
entire seniority-based pay scale. If seniority increments are not
justified after age 55, it is possible that the lack of justification
may start at an earlier age. It may well be true that an employee's
performance in certain lines of operations peaks at around age 40.
Should this be true, the seniority increments after age 40 would be
unjustified. If employment should continue beyond age 40, then, "life-
time employment" would have to be dissociated from the seniority wage
scale.
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Once we start quibbling the rationale of lifetime emplojTaent in
this way, it is unavoidable to notice that performance over a life
cycle varies from individual to individual, and from activity to activ-
ity. It would be folly to draw one curve and assume that everyone
within a firm or an organization conformed to that pattern. But once
allowance is made for individual variations in performance and pay, the
argument that all should stay in the same firm till retirement loses
its force, because poor performance in one firm and therefore poor pay
do not mean that the individual concerned has no competence that may
command higher value and result in better performance elsewhere.
Furthermore, there are other problems respecting how performance is
evaluated, where it is evaluated, how workers are assigned to jobs,
whether the opportunity for training is equal for everyone, etc. There
are also personal, health, and family problems of employees that
employers who profess to be concerned with employee welfare should not
overlook as determinants of their performance. Once attention is
directed to these problems, it is clear that there is not much knowledge
about them in the philosophy, logic, and practice of the conventional
lifetime employment system of Japan. This suggests that the employment
relationship can be individualized and that the employer and each
employee can periodically review the record and prospects of their
relationship, examine all conceivable career courses available inside
and outside the firm concerned, and choose that course both consider
optimal for the type of person the employee is and the potential and
skills he has.
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f4r. Tadashi Amaya, who directs a project on career development at
Oki Electric, a major telecommunications equipment producer, has pre-
sented to the Sumiya Council for Intermediate-Term Employment Policy a
model plan for individualized career management. He points out that
the economic fundamentals which made the conventional lifetime employ-
ment system possible have recently disappeared under the impact of eco-
nomic slowdowns and aging population. He then criticizes the incoherent
practices of Japanese firms that fail to meet the challenge of the dif-
ferent economic circumstances to the employment system. His plan
liberates the individual employee from the straight jacket of the con-
ventional lifetime employment system by ejqjanding the scope of choice
at each of several strategic points in the life cycle with respect to
the course of action for the next several years. Some general correla-
tions between age and factors that determine the individual's taste,
motivation, performance, etc. is postulated. Even the individual's
knowledge of himself is a changing function of age. The Amaya plan
synchronizes the individual's personal growth over the life cycle with
his career development with a view to the fullest possible realization
of the individual's potential. The role of the employer is important.
The presumption is that the employer who hires a worker fresh out of
school should normally keep him till retirement at 60 or a higher age
appropriate to the general trend of the aging of the Japanese. The
employer should supply all the requisite services for periodic reviews
of the personal and professional growth of each employee and for coun-
selling on personal and family problems that arise from different phases
of the life cycle. The employer and employee jointly determine the
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optimal course of career development. In preparation for the possibility
that the optimal course of career development for some employees may
lie outside the firm, the employer should maintain appropriate placement
service and be able to find the best alternative employers for them.
Thus, uninterrupted emplojnnent commensurate with rational inter-firm
mobility (a new form of lifetime employment) is ensured by joint efforts
of the employer and employee.
The almost complete individualization of career plans and problem
solving in the Amaya proposal seems to neglect the possibility that a
collective approach may still be productive with respect to common
problems that employees at similar life stages share among them. The
conventional seniority-linked pay scale at least purports to cope with
one common problem among employees: i.e., rising family expenditure as
the size and needs of the family grow. There are also other problems
that are correlated with age; e.g., health problems, anxiety about the
future, uncertainty about the meaning of life and work, fear of being
out of touch with the wider world, frictions in relationships with the
spouse and children, etc. These personal and micro-social problems
discourage work performance in varying degrees. At a major diversified
electric-electronic company, the management and union coordinate the
operation of age-linked programs to cope with these problems. The
basic method is group instruction and discussion. The employees in
their early forties are especially prone to personal and family crises
which often demoralize them in relation to work. But other age groups
also have their problems. The management and union recently structured
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the problem-solving programs for different age levels so that employees
move through them as they become older.
Thus it appears that the adjustment of the work force to tech-
nological change is just one part of the unavoidable adjustment of man
to his changing circumstances. What strikes the observer as a result
of interviewing "both sides" of industrial relations, management and
union, is that in Japan, both understand the nature of the changing
circumstances almost exactly the same way and that both agree on the
actual and likely problems and the essential elements in the solutions
looked for. In short, in Japan, the union is very much like management,
and management is very much like the union. Many company presidents
behave almost like union leaders when they make public speeches or
write books. They exalt the importance of human resources and recount
endless stories of how workers have contributed to innovations and pro-
ductivity. Regardless of rank or station, each worker is a manager who
is unusually well informed of the state of his company and of the state
of the general company which influences the performance of his company.
Especially, union leaders and managers are people of the same breed.
This is no mystery, because in Japan good union leaders are usually co-
opted into management and become good managers. The cross-fertilization
of union experience and managerial experience homogenizes the taste and
culture of the enterprise. Union activities train workers for managerial
functions. In many Japanese enterprises, the company headquarters and
the union halls co-exist side by side. The secretariat of the union is
run by the same business principles by which the company is run. The
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union and the company only differ in details not in principles, which
makes consultation and bargaining quite efficient. Different principles
generate a conflict, requiring power to resolve it. Different details
can be patched up by "give and take," often by "give and give."
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Foreign threat to employment in the Japanese electrical
and electronic industry?
There is no threat from international trade or Japanese firms'
foreign direct investment to employment in the Japanese electrical and
electronic industry (E & E industry hereinafter). This is a growth
industry in Japan, having arrived at the position of a leading industry
after other well-known leaders (textiles, shipbuilding, petro-chemicals,
steel, etc.) have run out of steam. The Japanese E & E industry suf-
fered from the OPEC shock but rebounded vigorously from 1975 on. In
terms of value added, the crisis of 1973-75 only wrought a minor dip in
the steeply rising long-run growth curve. E & E employment bottomed
out in 1975 and recovered the loss almost completely by 1980. Changes
in E & E employment during the 1970s will be discussed in the next sec-
tion. For the present, some statistical data are presented to show that
(1) imports pose no problem for Japan's E & E industry and that (2)
overseas investment by Japan's E & E firms, instead of exporting jobs,
rather creates more jobs in Japan. Table 1 presents Japan's E & E
imports as percent of its E & E exports. It is clear that Japan exports
far more E & E products than it imports. Although the data are not
entirely clear about trends, one may see a faint sign of decreasing
importance of imports in Table 1.
(Table 1 about here)
Japan's E & E imports predominantly come from more developed
countries which constitute Japan's reference group for international
competition in economic growth and technological progress. In one
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advanced branch of the E & E industry, Japan's imports rise to a signi-
ficant level, more than half and sometimes more than 80 percent of its
exports (electric apparatus for medical purposes, radiological apparatus).
For the Japanese, this is an incentive for improvements in technology
and production. The small weight of less developed countries as a
source of Japan's E & E imports is of course not surprising: their
technological backwardness relative to Japan. Somewhat surprising,
however, is that less developed countries are not showing stronger per-
formance than shown in Table 1 in the product lines where some of them
at least, those usually called NICs, may have technologically caught up
with Japan—radio and TV. Japan imports almost no radio or TV sets from
more developed countries. The radio and TV sets from less developed
countries are a miniscule proportion of Japanese export of these commo-
dities. To this extent, then, one may say that comparative advantage
is being reallocated among countries. Given the smallness of figures,
however, the increasing strength of some less developed countries poses
absolutely no threat to Japan's E & E industry as a whole or even in
its potentially vulnerable branches.
There is another source of potential threat to Japanese employment
—
Japanese firms' foreign direct investment setting up plants abroad to
produce things that could be produced in Japan. In some developed
countries, foreign direct investment by their companies is even con-
sidered equivalent to "job exports." Japanese foreign direct invest-
ment increased rapidly during the 1970s and there was some fear of job
exports at first. But it evaporated quickly. The dominant view today
is that far from exporting jobs, Japanese companies have been using
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foreign direct investment as a means of creating jobs at home in Japan.
If this view is held exclusively by company managements, one may con-
sider it a piece of propaganda. But since trade unions are no less
positive toward the employment effects of foreign direct investment,
one must suppose that there is something to the Japanese style of
foreign direct investment that is different from the practices of com-
panies based in other countries. Ever since 1973, the Federation of
the Unions of Electrical and Electronic Workers (Denki Roren—the
Federation hereinafter) has been studying the employment effects of
Japanese E & E firms' foreign direct investment. Findings are reported
once every other year. The latest report consolidating old and new
information was released in 1981. Its general conclusion is that
foreign direct investment has had positive effects on employment in
Japan. The Federation's earlier misgivings about possible job exports
are now completely dissolved.
The basic reason for domestic job creation through investment
abroad is that overseas production is a form of export substitution in
product lines which are most vulnerable to international competition or
various countries' protective policy. Production at the finishing
stage in the host country requires imports of intermediate inputs and
capital goods from Japan. Thus, insofar as overseas production protects
and promotes the markets for Japanese goods, foreign direct investment
can be seen as a means of protecting and promoting Japanese employment
in industries producing intermediate inputs and capital goods. A good
question to ask in this connection is whether Japanese firms really
intend to limit foreign direct investment only to the necessity of
-4-
export substitution. If true, the next question is how free the
Japanese firms are in pursuing this type of investment policy. Most
countries' industrial and trade policies may be independent constraints
on Japanese firms' action. These countries may demand of Japanese
firms more investment capital, management, technology, and input pro-
curement coupled with pressure for export of products to third
countries or to Japan. In Japan the last point is called a "boomerang
effect" which is equivalent to the concept of "job exports." Unlike
the original boomerang which in the hands of Australians captures and
brings game back, the "boomerang effect" in Japanese usage has taken on
a negative connotation: something sent out by the Japanese returns to
harm them. The Federation study of E & E employment shows that there
has been no "boomerang effect" on employment due to Japanese foreign
direct investment. Table 2 seems to support this proposition.
(Table 2 about here)
Table 2 indicates that in 1979, about 61 percent of the inputs of
Japanese E & E firms' overseas plants came from Japan, while about one-
third was supplied locally. At the same time, true to the export
substitution hypothesis, less than 5 percent of the output of overseas
plants was exported to Japan in 1979, while more than 80 percent was
marketed locally. When the 1979 figures are compared with earlier
figures, the character of export substitution seems to have been inten-
sified. (Although Japan's share in input supply to overseas plants
declined somewhat, the host countries' role as the market for their
output increased considerably.) Since output and employment in Japanese
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overseas plants increased enormously during the same period, the inten-
sified export substitution implies that Japanese employment at home
also increased due to the export-induced expansion of input production.
Another fascinating aspect of Japanese foreign direct investment
revealed by Table 2 is the relationship between input sourcing and out-
put marketing that varies among geographical regions of the world in
which Japanese E & E firms have invested. In Asia, inputs from Japan
proportionately declined from 63.4 percent of total in 1974 to 38.7
percent in 1979, while inputs locally supplied increased from 32.7 per-
cent to 58.5 percent. But local markets also absorbed a rising share
of output (from 45.5 percent to 58.6 percent), while Japan's share
declined from 29.1 percent to 12.0 percent. This seems to imply an
increasing indigenization of Japansese overseas plants in Asia in the
sense that they are buying proportionately more inputs and selling pro-
portionately more output within their host countries. (However, the
increased supply capability of Asian host countries may also have been
due to Japanese foreign direct investment in input production. It is
generally believed that Japanese firms, at home and abroad, prefer to
do business among themselves. When the input demand of Japanese over-
seas plants reaches a critical mass to justify an input plant, the
export substitution hypothesis may dictate that a plant be built to
produce and supply the appropriate inputs locally.)
A different pattern emerges for North America in Table 2. Japanese
plants in North America are buying proportionately more inputs from
Japan and selling proportionately more output in North America. The
character of foreign direct investment as export substitution is
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becoming purer. To make the story more interesting, (though not shown
in Table 2) the Federation study shows that the share of North America
in total Japanese E & E foreign direct investment has been rising
2
lately. If the weight shifts from areas of increasing indigenization
to increasing export substitution, the overall degree of export substi-
tution for the whole of Japanese foreign direct investment should rise.
However, the rise in Japanese direct investment in North America may
not have been a calculated move for the purpose of increasing the
overall degree of export substitution. It has been in part to appease
the North American complaints about imports of Japanese finished pro-
ducts. Nevertheless, it is often heard that the Japanese plants in
North America limit their operations to the barest surface of finished
products and bring all stages of intermediate inputs from Japan, aided
by the North American tariff structures which in effect favor such
practices.
It is then reasonably clear that Japanese E & E firms have protected
their employees' jobs in Japan by planning and implementing a particular
style of foreign direct investment, which has never been predicted by
3
Western theories of direct investment. In general, Japanese firms'
foreign direct investment is strictly subordinated to Japan's foreign
trade policy, which in turn is an instrument of Japan's industrial
4
policy. The supremacy of industrial policy from which explicit or
implicit guidance emanates with respect to foreign trade and investment
is certainly something unique to Japan. Japan's industrial policy has
consistently demonstrated a high degree of prescience in anticipating
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changes in industrial structure commensurate with high rates of econo-
mic growth. Foreign trade as an instrument of industrial policy has
been assigned the task of securing raw materials for Japan's growing
and changing industrial structure and finding the outlet for Japan's
industrial products which come out of the priority industries favored
by the predominating industrial policy. The principal policy goal is
to make the Japanese economic system well-balanced, highly flexible,
and capable of producing all desirable things within itself (a "one-set
economy" according to Miyohei Shinohara's another felicitous phrase).
To a country working for the creation of such an economic system by
conscious national design, laissez-faire has never been appealing as a
principle of foreign trade. What should be imported or exported must
be decided upon within the controlling framework of industrial policy.
This approach is not costless in the short run. But Japan has been
quite willing to forego potential benefits of free international trade
through specialization based on comparative advantage. Rather,
"comparative advantage" has been viewed as a dependent variable that
can be determined by other national objectives (like an industrial
structure Japan should have at any cost) which claim precedence over
free trade on the basis of comparative advantages of nations at an
arbitrary point in time.
In the framework of structural evolution considered desirable,
tangible and intangible favors must go to selected leading industries
which take on the features of "national policy industries." These
industries, in order to develop fast, must have the benefits of econo-
mies of scale which in turn depend on the size of the market. Japan's
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domestic market must therefore be reserved or protected for them. By
the same logic, together with domestic expansion, these industries'
efforts to utilize foreign markets for economies of scale must also be
assisted by policy action. In sum, the decision as to which industries
to encourage for the purpose of nurturing a desirable industrial struc-
ture (industrial policy) determines the shape of trade policy.
This does not mean that all industries with high export capability
have been generated and cultivated with the help of industrial policy.
Policy always has had to contend with the private market forces which
in a capitalist economy have their own laws of motion. In Japan, pri-
vate entrepreneurship unaided by policy has been vigorous and produced
competent industries under the international market forces. The notable
example is the textiles. Not so long ago, however, the Japanese tex-
tile industry was crippled by the protective policy of other countries
and by labor shortage at home. When the Japanese government inter-
vened in the textiles at this juncture, it was for a further weakening
of the industry by encouraging it to move out of Japan to less deve-
loped countries of Asia! That was because Japan's industrial policy
dictated a rapid transition to high-technology, knowledge-intensive
industries and because resources had to be preferentially reallocated
to these policy industries.
That the textile firms were the first to make extensive foreign
direct investment in Asian countries with the blessings of the Japanese
government is symbolic of Japan's foreign direct investment policy.
Foreign direct investment is an instrxoment to transfer unwanted or low-
priority industries to other countries. It is as if Japan had a sche-
dule of desirability in which various industries are properly weighted
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and ranked and followed it from the lowest end up to some cutting-off
point to determine which industries or products should be pushed out
via foreign direct investment. The emphasis on less developed
countries as hosts for Japanese investment fitted this policy very
well. The activities in which Japan invested had to be those which
less skilled managers and workers of less developed countries could
handle. This meant that the industries which were the perfect can-
didates for transfer were those which were losing out in Japan under
the impact of technological sophistication and social change. Foreign
direct investment of this type also made perfect sense from the market-
protection point of view, because if the Japanese did not start these
industries in less developed countries, indigenous entrepreneurs would
in due course rise to take advantage of the relatively easier entry
requirements. (Although Japanese-style foreign direct investment
hitherto narrated implies serious questions as to its costs and bene-
fits to the host country, these do not concern this paper for the
moment.)
The foreign direct investment by Japanese E & E firms which even
the trade unions almost gratefully acknowledge as export substitution,
not job exports, is consistent with the whole syndrome of Japanese
industrial policy, trade policy, and investment policy. Japan so far
has enjoyed an amazing degree of freedom in formulating and executing a
wide range of policies even in areas of action that affect the interests
of other countries partly because other countries have been less skilled
in the art of national economic policy-making and less consistent or
tenacious in sticking with adopted courses of action. Japan has also
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been fortunate in being overlooked by other countries as a source of
pressure that seriously limits or distorts the choices for them. In
other words, Japan has been a powerful determinant for the life chances
of many nations and yet the world has been blissfully ignorant of what
Japan has been doing. The Japanese usually complain that foreigners
do not understand them but wisely leave unstated how much they are
benefitting from the world's ignorance of and indifference to Japan.
-11-
Footnotes
The phrase was coined by Professor Miyohei Shinohara. In his
recent book, he uses the concept almost as an alias of latecomers'
"catching up" with advanced countries as seen from the perspective of
the latter. See M. Shinohara, Keizai talkoku no seisui (The rise and
fall of economic powers) (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1982).
2 —
Denki Roren (Federation of the Unions of Electrical and Electronic
Workers), Denki sangyo no chukiteki koyo tenbo (Intermediate-term
perspective on employment in the electrical and electronic industry)
(Tokyo, 1981), p. 31.
3
Theories of Japanese foreign direct investment have been advanced
by Professor Kiyoshi Kojima in Japan and by Professor Terutomo Ozawa in
the United States. See K. Kojima, Kaigai chokusetsu toshiron (Overseas
direct investment) (Tokyo: Diamond Publishing Co., 1977) and T. Ozawa,
Multinationalism, Japanese Style (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1979).
4
The simplified hierarchy of policies emerge from numerous discus-
sions of the three subject matters involved here. See, in addition to
the works of Kojima and Ozawa, Michael Blaker, ed. , The Politics of
Trade: U.S. and Japanese Policymaking for the GATT Negotiations (New
York: Columbia University, 1978), and Hiroya Ueno, "The Conception and
Evaluation of Japanese Industrial Policy," in Kazuo Sato, ed. , Industry
and Business in Japan (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1980), Chapter 10.
An expression in imitation of Chalmers Johnson, Japan's Public
Policy Companies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1978). ,
,
-12-
I. M. Destler, Haruhiro Fukui, and Hideo Sato, The Textile Wrangle:
Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971
.
(Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1979).
D/99
.194 .129 .187 .122 ('77) .123
.182 .114 .148 .089 ('77) .101
.012 .015 .039 .033 ('77) .022
Table 1
Japan's international trade in electric and electronic commodities:
imports by source (more developed or less developed countries)
and by commodity group as percent of exports, for selected years,
1970-78
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978
Total (72)-'"
1. Imports/exports
2. Imports from MDCs/exports
3. Imports from LDCs/ exports
Electric power and switch gear (722)
and equipment for distributing
electricity (723)
1. Imports/exports .191 ('71) .180 .199 .187 .158
2. Imports from MDCs/exports .179 ('71) .163 .151 .122 .133
3. Imports from LDCs/exports " .012 ('71) .017 .048 ,065 .025
Domestic electrical equipment (725)
1. Imports/exports
2. Imports from MDCs/exports
._ .
3. Imports from LDCs/exports ' -"-'•
Electric apparatus for medical
purposes, radiological apparatus (726)
1. Imports/exports
2. Imports from MDCs/exports
3. Imports from LDCs/exports
Television broadcast receivers (7241)
and radio broadcast receivers (7242)
1. Imports/exports
2. Imports from MDCs/exports
3. Imports from LDCs/exports
Telecommunications equipment (7249)
1. Imports/exports
2. Imports from MDCs/exports
3. Imports from LDCs/exports
.100 .105 .224 .148 .087
.099 - .101 .212 .136 .070
.001 .004 .012 .012 .017
877 .564 .644 .630 ('76) .833
877 " .563 .641 .621 ('76) .827
.001 .003 .009 ('76) .006
.002 .004 .013 .018 .010
.002 .004 .013 .018 .010
.121 ('69) .101 .132 .063 .093
.117 ('69) .092 .114 .045 .076
.004 .020 .018 .018 .017
Table 1 (continued)
Electrical line telephone and
telegraph equipments (72491)
1. Imports/exports
2. Imports from MDCs/exports
3. Imports from LDCs/exports
Microphones, loudspeakers and
amplifiers (72491)
1. Imports/exports
2. Imports from MDCs/exports
3. Imports from LDCs/exports
.043 ('69) .043 .068 .063 (-75) NA
.040 ('69) .040 .061 .055 ('75) NA
.003 ('69) .003 .007 .008 ('75) NA
.030 ('71) .036 .119 .135 ('75) NA
.027 ('71) .028 .087 .100 ('75) NA
.003 ('71) .008 .031 .035 ('75) NA
Other electric machinery and appartus
(729) and everything not mentioned
elsewhere
1. Imports/exports
2. Imports from MDCs/exports
3. Imports from LDCs/exports
.653 .330 .383 .410 .141
.604 .291 .310 .296 .107
.049 .039 .073 .114 .034
Sources : 0. E. C. D. , Statistics of Foreign Trade; Trade by Commodities (Paris).
Notes
Numbers in the parentheses are the commodity classes used in the 0. E. C. D.
commodity classification. The overall category is two-digit 72, which then is bro-
ken down into two-, three-, or more-digit levels. The commodity groups presented
here are selected to correspond to industry groups used in Japanese employment data
presented later in this paper. However, the correspondence is not perfect. It
appears that some change in classification occurred in and after 1976 with respect
to telecommunications equipment (7249) whose sub-classes (72491 and 72492) have since
disappeared.
Table 2
Input procurement by source and output marketing by destination
as percent of total by geographical area for Japanese overseas
subsidiaries and affiliates, 1974 and 1979
Procured Sold
Area from: 1974 1979 to: 1974 1979
Host country 33.2 33.6 Host country 55.4 81.2
Third country 3.7 5.8 Third country 21.8 14.0
All areas Japan 62.9 60.6 Japan 22.8 4,8
Total 99.8 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0
Host country 32.7 58.5 Host country 45.5 58.6
Third country 3.7 2.9 Third country 25.2 29.4
Asia Japan 63.4 38.7 Japan 29.1 12.0
Total 99.8 100.1 Total 99.8 100.0
Host country 48.5 13.8 Host country 90.6 98.9
Third country — 10.1 Third country 1.3 0.9
North America Japan 51.4 76.1 Japan 8.0 0.2
Total 99.9 100.0 Total 99.9 100.0
Sources : Denki Roren (Federation of the Unions o^ ElectricajL and
_
Electronic Workers), Denki sangyo no chukiteki koyo tenbo
(Intermediate-term perspective on employment in electrical
and electronic industries) (Tokyo, 1981), p. 34.
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The Ultimate Emplojnnent Guarantee:
Marketing, Product, and Process Innovations
There are two sources of instability that affect the employment
security of the work force in any firm. One is the cyclical instabil-
ity of the aggregate demand. The other is the completion of a product
life cycle without a new product to take its place.
When the aggregate demand slackens and the sales decline over the
whole range of products, Japanese firms intensify marketing efforts,
often producing considerable innovations in sales techniques, market '
organization, cultivation of the consumer taste, etc. Since laying
off workers or idling the plant cannot be easily resorted to, Japanese
firms also intensify efforts to "rationalize" the production process
to cut costs and lower prices. It appears that Japanese firms are less
willing to resign to the dictates of the aggregate demand than firms
in other countries. The latter are accustomed to cyclical fluctuations
and do not resist resorting to layoffs or plant idling. In Japan,
firms display a sort of provincial stubbornness in refusing to acquiesce
with the general trend of the economy. They seem to feel that in busi-
ness there is only one way to go—up—regardless of the general eco-
nomic conditions. Since each firm behaves this way, all the firms in
the aggregate succeed in preventing the cycles from taking place or
minimizing their scales.
Employment adjustment due to the expiration of a product life cycle
requires a fine tuning with the rise of another product. Firms with
diversified products with wide-ranging R&D have the best chance to
cope with problems due to product life cycles. This may be at the
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root of the Japanese propensity to make a firm into a "comprehensive
maker" or to form a group with other firms producing different things.
The well-remembered "depression" that engulfed home appliances and con-
sumer durables in 1965 was the result of dying product life cycles
aggravated by a decline in the aggregate demand. The boom in home
appliances and durables which started in 1955 ran out of its course in
the early 1960s. The diffusion rates of major durables among Japanese
households were pressing toward saturation points (in 1963, 89% for
black and white TV, 82% for radio, 66% for washing machine, etc.).
The "depression" induced extensive turnovers of managerial and execu-
tive personnel and considerable workforce redundancies which were man-
aged through job transfers and temporary Japanese-style layoffs. The
wholesale and retail chains were reorganized largely due to the whole-
salers' and retailers' revolts against the grips of the manufacturers.
Fortunately, exports continued to increase unabated for Japanese-made
E & E articles. And a new product life cycle was on the rise just
when the previous boom had died. That was color TV. New products and
new generations of established products rode with color TV into a new
boom. This new boom in home E & E appliances was aided by the renewal
of rapid economic growth from 1965 to the OPEC shock of 1973, though
with minor disturbances due to the Nixon shock of 1971 and the subse-
quent exchange rate realignment and floating. Although the domestic
markets tapered off after 1973, the unusual strength of the markets
abroad for these goods continued to support the growth of the Japanese
E & E industry. Product innovations have also been stimulated by the
strength of the foreign markets. For example, the rapid growth of
VTRs (videotape recorders) owes very much to the foreign markets.
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In addition to marketing and product innovations, there is another
kind of innovation which according to some observers, is uniquely
Japanese; i.e., process innovation. This refers to the aggregate ef-
fect of numerous small efforts by workers on the shop floor to improve
the efficiency of production and the quality of products. The willing-
ness of the individual Japanese workers to take the initiative in in-
troducing measures for process improvements is widely-known. This is
part of their eagerness to learn and master any kind of production pro-
cess in the interest of maximizing the overall productivity of the
firm. Economists summarize the effects of such worker efforts on pro-
ductivity by the concept of "learning curve" proxied by the curve of
working time per unit of output over time. For a given technology for
a given product (e.g. , assembly lines for TV production common to
Japan and other countries), the Japanese are said to show a steeper
"learning curve" than workers in other countries. Thus, for the same
product with the same technology, a given investment that can be prof-
itable in Japan may not be profitable elsewhere. The end result is
the triumph of Japanese manufacturing in international competition.
Lester C. Thurow of M.I.T. is foremost in emphasizing the impor-
tance of process innovation as a major source of rising productivity.
His theory of the "learning curve" is consciously based on his under-
standing of Japanese experience. A few passages from one of his books
may illustrate the factors involved in realizing a steep "learning
curve." "The learning curve is related to the process of informal,
on-the-job acquisition of skills and team productivity. In the process
of production workers learn and improve their individual job skills
-4-
and learn to work together as a team." "But the process [of learning]
is not automatic. It depends upon high quality management and a co-
operative work force." "Starting a class war is hardly the way to
proceed." And speaking of the incentives for performance built into
2
the Japanese employment system, Thurow observes:
With lifetime employment and seniority wages, technical
progress is not threatening. .. [to] either employment or wages.
With the typical worker getting about 50 percent of his or
her wages in twice yearly bonuses that depend upon profits,
a steep learning curve is of direct concern to each worker.
Every worker has an incentive to maximize productivity by
welcoming technical change, learning new skills, and contrib-
uting to industrial team work. .
.
Thurow does not think that the relationship between the types of
incentives and industrial relations in Japan is culture-specific.
"Faced with the same incentives, U.S. workers would respond in the
same way," he concludes. However, some students in the College of
Engineering at the University of Illinois who were exposed to the
Lester book as a part of their instructional materials expressed doubts
about the applicability of the Japanese style incentives to American
workers. On "lifetime employment," they invariably ask: "how can you
make people work without a constant threat of layoff for poor perfor-
mance? You only encourage workers to goof off by guaranteeing employ-
ment." With respect to bonuses based on results, they suspect that
workers' share is often unfairly calculated and that it is better to
contract a fixed rate of pay so it cannot be cut back regardless of
company profits. They also like "rigid work rules" (which prevent pro-
cess innovations) by demanding that they should know exactly what is
expected of them. In effect, American workers prefer to be mere
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automatons in the process of production, each knowing exactly what to
do, but no more or no less. The reactions of the students indicate
that the most important ingredient of the Japanese employment system
is apparently lacking in the American employment relationship: a high
degree of trust between workers and managers. By comparison with the
American-style labor-management relations, it almost appears as if
workers and managers in Japan were indistinguishable "citizens" of the
firm with equal rights to participate in its governance.
Finally, in listening to Japanese managers and workers for their
views of production and emplojrment, one is struck with the strategic
role of nationalism in binding all Japanese together. At the level of
the firm, the clearest battle line is not between us, workers and them,
company, but us, Japanese against them, Americans, Asians, Europeans,
etc. Within the firm, executives, managers, and workers are equally
worried about their firm's competitiveness in relation to, say,
American firms. Because of the imperative of having to win at this
competition, the Japanese cannot afford the luxury of prolonged con-
flict between management and labor some say. It appears then that all
employees of a Japanese firm, regardless of their levels in the orga-
nization, consider the survival and prosperity of the firm a direct
component of the larger National Interest. Everyone is apparently
ready any time to suffer a fair share of sacrifice, if necessary, in
the name of Japan's national interest in a world which the Japanese
generally view as basically unfriendly or even hostile to Japan. The
feeling of loneliness at the international level pulls the Japanese
together and drives them into self defense by building an impregnable
-6-
industrial garrison in the Japanese islands. From a different view-
point, the intense nationalism recalls a not-so-forgotten image of
Japanese fascism. Fortunately, however, there seems to be enough de-
sire among the Japanese for "internationalization" to put the fear of
untoward consequences of Japanese nationalism to rest for ever.
-7-
Footnotes
Tester C. Thurow, The Zero-Sum Society (Penguin Books, 1980)
^2—84, '
Ibid
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